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CASENOTES
DEADMAN'S STATUTE-NEBRASKA INTERPRETATION
Light v. Ash (Neb. 1963).
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Light v. Ash- the Nebraska Supreme Court overruled the
forty-one year old case of Kiser v. Sullivan.2 Kiser held that a non-
resident spouse had no direct legal interest in the outcome of a
suit involving Nebraska real estate which would render him in-
competent to testify under section 25-1202, 3 because his marital
interest could be barred if his spouse conveyed the property without
his joining in the conveyance.4 Section 25-1202, known as the
"Deadman's Statute," states: 5
No person having a direct legal interest in the result of any civil
action or proceeding, when the adverse party is the representative
of a deceased person, shall be permitted to testify to any transaction
or conversation had between the deceased person and the wit-
ness ....
Plaintiffs in Light v. Ash brought action against their brother
and deceased mother in the district court to impose a constructive
trust on two tracts of farm land. They alleged that, for the purpose
of defrauding them, their mother procured quitclaim deeds of their
interests in their father's estate upon her oral agreements and
promises to retain the land unencumbered during her lifetime and
1 174 Neb. 627, 119 N.W.2d 90 (1963) (Supplemental opinion and re-
hearing).
2 106 Neb. 454, 184 N.W. 93 (1921).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956).
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-105 (Reissue 1956). Although this discussion is
limited to the application of section 25-1202 to cases involving real
and personal property, it has been held that the word "transaction"
makes it applicable to automobile accident cases. Bruno v. Kramer,
176 Neb. 597, 126 N.W.2d 885 (1964). This case held that in an action
against the estate of a decedent driver of a vehicle involved in an auto-
mobile accident, a plantiff's testimony is barred insofar as it relates
to the actions or movements of decedent driver's vehicle immediately
before or at the time of the accident. This was a four to three decision
in which the three judges dissenting stated that "[IUn our opinions
the dead man's statute is given too broad an application in Fincham v.
Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137. We think the rule therein should
be modified by giving a reasonable definition of the word "trans-
action" as used in 25-1202, R.R.S. 1943."
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956).
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that upon her death the property would descend to plainiffs.6 Not-
withstanding these promises their mother later transferred the land
by warranty deed to the defendant brother.
For the purpose of proving the alleged oral promises, plaintiffs
offered, and the court admitted, the testimony of nonresident
spouses of the plaintiffs. The testimony was allowed in reliance
upon the decision in Kiser v. Sullivan.7 The district court ruled, on
a motion by defendants, that the evidence as a whole was insuf-
ficient to establish a constructive trust in favor of plaintiffs and
entered a verdict for defendants. The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court decision on the same grounds.8 Thereafter,
the Supreme Court granted a rehearing and again affirmed on the
same grounds, but stated further that even had there been sufficient
evidence, the testimony of the nonresident spouses should have been
excluded. The court, thus, specifically overruled Kiser v. SullivanY
The court stated, contrary to the holding of Kiser, that nonresident
spouses had a direct legal interest in the result of the suit which
rendered them incompetent to testify under the Nebraska "Dead-
man's Statute."'1
II. RATIONALE OF THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT
Light v. Ash gives the most recent and probably the most defi-
nite interpretation of the "direct legal interest" clause of the "Dead-
man's Statute" that the Supreme Court of Nebraska has ever ex-
pounded. The court stated that "the only criterion for determining
the competency of a witness under this statue [section 25-1202] is
whether or not the witness will benefit from the result of the case
in which he seeks to testify."' In most other cases the Supreme
Court of Nebraska had determined competency under section
0174 Neb. 44, 119 N.W.2d 903 (1963).
7 106 Neb. 454, 184 N.W. 93 (1921).
8 Light v. Ash, 174 Neb. 44, 115 N.W.2d 903 (1962). The original opinion
by the court gives a more complete fact situation than is given in the
decision on rehearing.
9 106 Neb. 454, 184 N.W. 93 (1921). There is some doubt as to whether
Light v. Ash was a proper case in which to overrule the Kiser decision.
After affirming the decision because the evidence was insufficient,
the court overruled this case and stated that the evidence should not
have been admitted at all. 174 Neb. 627, 119 N.W.2d 90 (1963). The
overruling of this decision was not necessary to the outcome of the case.
10 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956).
"Light v. Ash, 174 Neb. 627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90, 91 (1963).
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25-1202 by applying the principle of "direct legal interest," but had
failed in giving a workable definition of the phrase.1
2
The court stated in Light v. Ash that "under these cases,13 the
interest of the witness in the result of the litigation, and not his
relationship or status with interested parties, determined the ques-
tion of the competency of the witness to testify,'1 4 and that "with
the exception of Kiser v. Sullivan ... this court has consistently
adhered to this construction of the statute."'15 The court further
stated that "in Kiser v. Sullivan we created an exception to the
general rule that the competency of a witness under section 25-
1202 R.R.S. 1943, was based solely on his interest in the result of
the litigation."'0
Light v. Ash can also be interpreted as an attempt to equalize
the status of residents and nonresidents in this area. The court
stated that "the spouse of a nonresident owner of Nebraska land
has the same marital interest in it as does the spouse of a resident
owner,"17 and that "the assumption in Kiser v. Sullivan... that a
nonresident spouse had no marital interest in Nebraska real estate
because the title owning spouse could bar it without a joinder of
his spouse, is fallacious."'18 Whether it is or is not fallacious is a
point where issue could be taken with the court. It is difficult to
think of a difference in marital interest that would be more pro-
nounced than the resident spouse's ability to protect his interest by
abstaining from joining on a deed.
12 See Parker v. Wells, 68 Neb. 647, 92 N.W. 717 (1903). Here the court
determined that a witness was competent to testify unless a favorable
result in the suit would invest him with some "direct legal interest" in
the subject of the controversy.
13 See Craig v. Seebecker, 135 Neb. 221, 280 N.W. 913 (1938); In re Estate
of Tilton, 129 Neb. 872, 263 N.W. 217 (1935); Oft v. Ohrt, 128 Neb. 848,
260 N.W. 571 (1935). These cases contain similar, but less exact defini-
tions than does Light v. Ash.
14 174 Neb. 627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90, 91 (1963). But see 174 Neb. 627, 629,
115 N.W.2d 90, 92 (1963). (Spencer J., dissenting). Judge Spencer
casts doubt on the fact that Kiser v. Sullivan was an exception, as the
court states, by showing that a similar rule of law was followed even
before dower and curtesy were abolished in 1907. Kiser may have
been merely an affirmation of the law as it had exised for many years.
15 174 Neb. 627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90, 91 (1963).
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 629, 119 N.W.2d at 92.
's bid.
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III. COMPETENCY: "DEADMAN'S STATUTE"
The "Deadman's Statute"'19 is an incompetency rule. Its purpose
is to prevent the opportunity and temptation to give false testi-
mony.20 Since 1855 the Nebraska Legislature's general trend has
been one of increasing liberalism in deciding who should be com-
petent to testify. More persons are competent to testify today than
in 1855.21 Until Light, the Nebraska Supreme Court, as shown by
Kiser, has also followed this trend in construing the "Deadman's
Statute." That the legislature intended for more persons to be
competent to testify is shown by the fact that it acquiesced in Kiser
for forty-one years.
In dealing with the Nebraska "Deadman's Statute" it is neces-
sary to remember that its scope is limited to certain given situa-
tions. For example, many cases can be found where it first appears
that the statute should have been applied in order to make the
witness incompetent to testify; but a thorough reading of the
case shows that the witness was actually testifying as to anoher
person's conversation with the deceased rather than as to his own.22
Problems of this nature are easily avoided by a careful reading
of the statute and the facts of the cases.
The statute itself, however, gives no solution to the problem
of determining when an interest is a "direct legal interest." A
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956).
20 2 WiGVoRE, EVIDENCE § 579, at 686 (3d ed. 1940). Pospishil, The "Dead-
man's Statute" In Nebraska, 31 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1952).
21 In 1855, in its first session, the Nebraska Territorial Legislature
adopted the evidence section of the Iowa Code. IowA LAws c. 30 (1851).
Territorial Laws of Neb. 1st sess. p. 134 (1855). This chapter on evi-
dence had within it a section that changed the strict witness dis-
qualification rule of the common law, and provided that "every human
being of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath is
a competent witness in all cases both civil and criminal." The section
immediately following provided that the "facts which have heretofore
caused the exclusion of testimony may still be shown for the purposes of
lessening its credibility." When these two sections are read together, it
is obvious that the legislature's intention was to allow more persons
to testify-persons who would previously have been barred therefrom
by the strict common law rules of evidence.
The 1865 amended statute dropped the word "certain" from the
statute, and it now reads "direct legal interest" instead of "direct, cer-
tain, legal interest." Territorial Laws of Neb. 10th sess. p. 35 (1865).
22 Nelson v. Nelson, 133 Neb. 458, 275 N.W. 829 (1937) where a grand-
daughter was allowed to testify to conversation between mother and
deceased grandmother.
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careful reading of the cases construing "direct legal interest" be-
comes necessary,23 and the importance of Light v. Ash and Kiser V.
Sullivan becomes apparent. Though the statute itself is narrow
in scope, it is broad when compared with the area that is covered
by the decision in Light v. Ash. The decision purports to control
only situations arising under Kiser v. Sullivan, which deal with
nonresident spouses and owners of real property. But, the impact
of the decision could extend far beyond these bounds.
IV. RESIDENT AND NONRESIDENT SPOUSES'
INTERESTS CONTRASTED
Under section 30-101 of the Nebraska statutes,24 which deals
with real property descent, a surviving spouse of a person dying
intestate receives a statutory share of real estate of which the
deceased was seized during the marriage and also any legal or
equitable interests which the deceased had at the time of death. By
this statute the surviving spouse receives real estate which (1) has
not been lawfully conveyed by husband and wife, or (2) has not
been conveyed by the deceased while the husband or wife was a
nonresident of the state, or (3) has not been lawfully devised by
the deceased.2 5 A surviving spouse, by this statute, does not receive
a share of real property which was conveyed by deceased alone,
if either the husband or wife was a nonresident at the time of the
conveyance. Section 30-105 also specifically provides that a spouse's
interest in real estate may be barred by a conveyance by the one
seized if either of them was a nonresident at the time of the con-
23 Pospishil, The "Deadman's Statute" in Nebraska, 31 NEB. L. REV. 1,
14 (1952).
24 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-101 (Reissue 1956): "W'hen any person shall alie,
leaving a husband or wife surviving, all the real estate of which the
deceased was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the
marriage, or in which the deceased was possessed of an interest either
legal or equitable at the time of his or her death, which has not been
lawfully conveyed by the husband and wife while residents of this
state, or by the deceased while the husband or wife was a non-
resident of this state, and which has not been lawfully devised, shall
descend. .. ." (Emphasis added).
2 5 Even if the deceased did lawfully devise, this statute will operate if
the surviving spouse elects to take against the will under NEB. REV. STAT.§ 30-107 (Reissue 1956). This right of election apparently applies
equally to. residents and nonresidents, for the statute speaks of "any
person.":
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veyance.26 A nonresident spouse's interest is, therefore, not pro-
tected from a conveyance made by his or her spouse, who is seized
of the property. Also, a resident spouse's interest is not protected
if his spouse is a nonresident and seized of the property.27 Where
both spouses are residents, the interest of the spouse not seized is
protected.
Because of these statutes concerning real property (1) neither
a resident nor a nonresident spouse's interest can be defeated by
will; 29 (2) under section 30-107 either may elect to take under the
will or by statutory share under the provisions of section 30-101;30
(3) under section 30-10531 only a nonresident spouse's interest in
2 6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-105 (Reissue 1956): "The right of a married man
or woman to inherit a part or all of the real estate of which his or her
spouse was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the
marriage, may be barred by a conveyance executed by such husband
and wife while residents of this state, and if either such husband or
wife be not a resident of this state, by a deed of conveyance executed
either by both of such parties or by the one seized at the time of such
conveyance .... ." (Emphasis added). It should be noted that the statute
purports to say that if either spouse is a nonresident, the one seized
may bar the other. Kiser v. Sullivan, 106 Neb. 454, 184 N.W. 93 (1921).
A deed from a nonresident married woman gives good title to real
estate without husband joining in conveyance.
27 For the purpose of simplifying this discussion, "resident spouse" denotes
a situation where both spouses are residents. The term "nonresident
spouse" applies to any other situation. This problem arises because
§ 30-105 states that "interest in real estate may be barred if either of
them was a nonresident . . . ." If either is a nonresident, the one not
seized is a nonresident spouse.
28NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-107 (Reissue 1956)): "If any real estate be de-
vised by a deceased husband or wife, to the surviving husband or wife
of such deceased person, or other provision be made for him or her
in the last will and testament of such deceased person, he or she shall
be entitled to his or her election to take the lands so devised, or the
provision made for him or her in the last will and testament of such
deceased husband or wife, or to take by inheritance, descent and
distribution the interest in the estate of the deceased, provided by
law .... "
29 Richardton v. Johnson, 97 Neb. 749, 151 N.W. 314 (1915) (wife cannot
lawfully dispose of her real estate by will so as to deprive husband
of interest given him by § 30-101); In re Estate of Robertson, 86 Neb.
490, 125 N.W. 1093 (1910) (husband cannot by will deprive his wife of
all interest in his property).
30 In re Estate of Manning, 85 Neb. 60, 122 N.W. 711 (1909) (widow has
right of election).
31 Kiser v. Sullivan, 106 Neb. 454, 184 N.W. 93 (1921) (deed from a non-
resident married woman gives good title to real estate without husband
joining in conveyance).
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real property can be defeated by a conveyance made by the de-
ceased during his lifetime.32
For the purpose of comparison, it is here relevant to discuss
and contrast the interests of residents and nonresidents in personal
property situated in Nebraska. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
set down the rule that "the only criterion for determining the
competency of a witness under this statute [section 25-1202] is
whether or not the witness will benefit from the result of the case
in which he seeks to testify."33 It therefore would seem logical to
apply this rule to cases concerning personal property, if the spouse's
interests are as "direct" and "legal" as those in real property.
Section 30-103 deals with personal property and states that
"when any person shall die possessed of any personal estate or of
any right or interest therein, not lawfully disposed of by his last
will, the same shall be applied and distributed as follows . .. -34
The statute then provides for the payment of certain costs and
fees out of the personal estate. Thereafter, the personal property
is to be distributed in the same manner as provided for in section
30-101. A surviving spouse's interest in personal property is ap-
parently the same whether he is a resident or a nonresident of
Nebraska, for the statute speaks of "any person." Both residents
and nonresidents (1) cannot have their interests defeated by will;
(2) may elect to take by will or statutory share under section
30-107; (3) can have their interest defeated by a conveyance made
by the deceased before his death. When the nature of a spouse's
interest in personal property is thus compared, it becomes apparent
that a nonresident spouse has the same marital interests in personal
property that he has in real property.
His interests are the same in that (1) in both real and per-
sonal property his marital interest may be defeated by his spouse
without his consent; (2) in neither situation can his marital interest
be defeated by will; (3) with either real or personal property he
can elect to take by statute or will. As a nonresident spouse's in-
terest in real property is identical to his interest in personal
property, it would seem that the rule laid down by the court con-
cerning his competency to testify under section 25-1202 would be
uniform for both. But, after Light v. Ash it is not.
32 See Appendix.
33 Light v. Ash, 174 Neb. 627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90 (1962).
34 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-103 (Reissue 1956).
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V. STATE OF THE LAW UNDER KISER v. SULLIVAN
Before Light v. Ash 33 the court's application of section 25-1202
was somewhat uniform. The Nebraska Supreme Court has con-
sistently held, in actions against the representative of a deceased
person involving money and personal property, that either spouse
is competent to testify for the other with reference to transactions
or conversations with the deceased person.36 Before Light v. Ash,
a nonresident spouse was competent to testify against the repre-
sentative of a deceased person under section 25-1202 in cases con-
cerning either real or personal property. This was a rational result
because the nonresident spouse's interests in result of cases con-
cerning real or personal property is apparently identical. A resident
spouse could not testify against the representative of a deceased
person in real property actions, but could in personal property
cases. This was also a rational result as a resident spouse was
held to have a greater interest in the result of a real property suit
than in one involving personal property, because his interest in
personal property could be defeated by his spouse's conveyance.
Before Light v. Ash, the court had only one competency rule which
was applied uniformly to real and personal property cases, and
which was based on interest.3 7 This rule is restated in Light v. Ash 38
as follows:
The only criterion for determining the competency of a witness
under this statute is whether or not the witness will benefit from
the result of the case in which he seeks to testify.
35 174 Neb. 44, 115 N.W.2d 90 (1962).
36In Gillette v. Morrison, 9 Neb. 395, 401-02, 2 N.W. 853 (1879), the
husband of plaintiff in a suit on a note as her separate property did
not have a direct legal interest in the result of the suit which ren-
dered him incompetent to testify. In Foster v. Murphy, 76 Neb. 576,
107 N.W. 843 (1906), a wife's interest in the action of her husband for
funds as administrator was not a legal interest which disqualified
her as a witness. In Wilkins v. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31
(1934), a wife was held to be a competent witness in her husband's
action on an alleged lost note. In Bratt v. Wishart, 127 Neb. 836, 257
N.W. 258 (1934), plaintiff's wife was held to be competent to testify
concerning a trust declared for value of improvements on real estate.
In re Estate of Jelinek, 146 Neb. 452, 20 N.W.2d 325 (1945), the hus-
band of claimant for a distributive share of money from her father's
estate was held competent to testify. See Pospishil, The "Deadman's
Statute" In Nebraska, 31 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1951).
37 Craig v. Seebecker, 135 Neb. 221, 280 N.W. 913 (1938); In re Estate of
Tilton, 129 Neb. 872, 263 N.W. 217 (1935); Oft v. Ohrt, 128 Neb. 848, 260
N.W. 571 (1935).
38 Light v. Ash, 174 Neb. 627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90 (1962).
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[Tihe interest of the witness in the result of the litigation, and not
his relationship or status with interested parties, determined the
competency of the witness to testify.
VI. STATE OF THE LAW UNDER LIGHT v. ASH
After Light v. Ash,30 the nonresident spouse cannot testify under
section 25-1202 in actions concerning real property, but under the
prevailing cases can still testify in personal property cases. Be-
cause the court stated that "the only criterion for determining the
competency of a witness . . . is whether or not the witness will
benefit from the result of the case in which he seeks to testify,"4 it
is apparent that Light v. Ash did not reach a result consistent
with the line of personal property cases. If the nonresident spouse's
interest is equal in both real and personal property cases, then his
benefit from the result of the suit would be identical. Therefore, if
he is competent to testify in one action he should also be com-
petent in the other. It appears that the court is faced with two
rules concerning what kind of interest is a "direct legal interest"-
one for real property and another for personal property. As the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in Light v. Ash did not even mention
personal property cases, it must be assumed that it had no inten-
tion of overruling the long line of personal property decisions. But
the court has set down a definition of "direct legal interest,"
which if applied to personal property cases, could do nothing but
overrule the personal property decisions as they now stand.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has made the "Deadman's
Statute' 41 more inclusive as to cases involving real property. It is
entirely possible that the court could extend this broad con-
struction to suits involving personal property, and hold some wit-
nesses incompetent who are now held competent, under the pre-
vailing personal property decisions. If the court declines, however,
to overrule the series of cases involving a spouse's right to testify
against the representative of a deceased in personal property
actions, it will be faced with the impossibility of distinguishing
Light v. Ash from the personal property cases on the basis of
interest and benefit. On this basis Light stands in opposition to
the personal property decisions.
39174 Neb. 627, 119 N.W.2d 90 (1962).
40 Ibid.
4 1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956).
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CONCLUSION
The trend in the United States is toward abolition of the com-
mon law rules and statutes which bar persons from testifying
because they are interested in the outcome of the litigation. 42
Nebraska, in Light v. Ash, appears to have taken a step away
from this trend. This decision holds that for purposes of the "Dead-
man's Statute," in real property litigation, the residency or non-
residency of the spouse makes no difference, overruling a dis-
tinction relied upon for forty-one years. And this is despite that fact
that there is a substantial property law difference: A resident
spouse's real property interest can not be defeated by an inter
vivos transfer, a nonresident spouse's interest can be defeated by
an inter vivos transfer.
The court has extended the prohibition of the "Deadman's
Statute" into areas of real property where the interests of resident
and nonresident spouses are the same as their interests in personal
property. A logical extension, then, is to apply the prohibitions of
the "Deadman's Statute" to all cases in the personal property
area since the interests in both areas are equal. It will be difficult
to draw a distinction allowing spousal testimony in personal prop-
erty litigation.
Victor J. Lich, Jr. '65
APPENDIX
RESIDENCY REAL PROPERTY PERSONAL PROPERTY
Both spouses are (a) Spouse's interest (a) Spouse's interest can
residents. cannot be defeated by be defeated by inter
inter vivos conveyance.* vivos conveyance.***
(b) Spouse's interest (b) Spouse's interest
cannot be defeated by cannot be defeated by
will.** will.**
"Deadman's Statute" "Deadman's Statute"
would apply. may apply as a result of
Light v. Ash.
42 McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 65, at 142 (1954).
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(a) Spouse's interest can
be defeated by inter
vivos conveyance.*
(b) Spouse's interest
cannot be defeated by
will.**
"Deadman's Statute"
would apply. Light v.
Ash.
(a) Spouse's interest can
be defeated by inter
vivos conveyance.*
(b) Spouse's interest
cannot be defeated by
will.*
Appears that "Dead-
man's Statute" would
apply following Light v.
Ash.
(a) Spouse's interest
can be defeated by inter
vivos conveyance.*
(b) Spouse's interest
cannot be defeated by
will.**
(Under normal Conflict
of Law rules, the Ne-
braska law would be un-
important).
(a) Spouse's interest can
be defeated by inter
vivos conveyance.**
(b) Spouse's interest
cannot be defeated by
will.**
Application of "Dead-
man's Statute" depend-
ent upon application of
Light v. Ash to personal
property area.
(Under normal Conflict
of Law rules, the Ne-
braska law would be un-
important).
Appears that "Dead-
man's Statute" would
apply, following Light v.
Ash.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-105 (Reissue 1956).
** NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-107 (Reissue 1956).
*** See cases cited at note 30 supra.
Both spouses are
nonresidents
One having
seisen or being
owner is a resi-
dent, other
spouse is a
nonresident.
One having
seisen or being
owner is a non-
resident, other
spouse is a
resident.
